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With ideological parties being better informed about the state of
the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard
to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be
agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the gov-
ernment to signal to the voters its private information about the ne-
cessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will
be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party govern-
ments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for
the voter.
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1 Introduction
Participating parties of a coalition government often differ in their policy
preferences so that they have to find an agreement on policy reforms. It is
generally argued this makes the implementation of reforms more difficult in
coalition rather than single-party governments (see, e.g., Tsebelis, 2002). We
argue that the opposite may be the case if the parties in power have private
information about policy shocks. In this case, the fact that a proposed policy
has been agreed to by all coalition parties despite their different preferences
provides valuable information to the voters about the need for the reform.
Crucial to our argument is the asymmetric information between policy-
makers and voters which seems to be an almost systemic feature of democ-
racies. Insight into the facts is very often better for the government making
the policy proposals than for the voter who has to vote on the policy. Typ-
ically governments have large administrations with specialists working for
them, resources can be spent on obtaining external expertise, and in some
instances such as security issues governments have access to documents that
are not disseminated to the public.
When policymakers are motivated ideologically, asymmetric information
leads to a moral hazard problem. They may offer a distorted presentation
of the available information so as to find approval for policies which conform
to their own preferences, rather than those of the voters. Accordingly, when
the voter is confronted with a reform proposal he is unsure about how to
assess it. Does it merely reflect the policymakers’ ideological position on a
policy, or is it also beneficial to the voter? Confronted with this uncertainty,
he may vote down reform proposals and adhere to the status quo, even if he
would have agreed to the policy change had he known the true state of the
world.
In a coalition government that includes parties with heterogenous prefer-
ences this problem may be less severe. When each of the parties effectively
has a veto right, proposals that are overly biased towards the particular in-
terests of an individual party will not find approval of the coalition partners.
Therefore, approval of a reform proposal by heterogenous coalition partners
can be an informative signal for the voter.
For an illustrative example consider the Israeli peace policy. In the na-
tional elections for the Knesset in May 1999, the Labor Party and its part-
ners won 26 seats followed by the Likud party with 19 seats, and the ultra-
orthodox Schas party with 17 seats. The newly elected prime minister Ehud
Barak formed a coalition government including the ultra-orthodox party. In
September 1999 Barak and Arafat signed a schedule for the implementation
of the Wye agreement (“Wye 2”) which codified the restitution of land con-
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trolled by Israel to the Palestinians, and the release of Palestinian prisoners.
It was sought to overcome the stagnation in the implementation of “Wye 1”
and give a new momentum to the peace process. Arguably, the fact that the
ultra-orthodox Schas approved such a policy had increased the governments
credibility that this reform was actually in the national interest.
In the paper we focus on the example of a leftist party. Due to the moral
hazard problem mentioned above, it cannot credibly transmit information
that support a leftist policy reform. Now suppose that there is a second,
centrist party whose policy preferences lie further to the right. With the
centrist coalition partner the leftist party gains in credibility when proposing
a leftist policy because the centrist party would veto such a proposal unless
it is actually supported by the available information. Hence, a coalition
government may find it easier to get public support, especially for those
reforms that are also in the interest of the voters. This is beneficial not only
for the voters and the coalition-joining partner, but usually also for the party
which in the original situation had a majority on its own.
Our contribution distinguishes itself from most existing studies on policy
reforms by stressing the informative role of coalition governments when vot-
ers are typically less well informed about the necessity of a policy change.1
Thus, it is related to earlier work by Lupia (1992, 1994), who shows how
badly-informed voters may infer information from agenda-setters when con-
testing an election is costly or when a policy can be endorsed by third parties.
While we look into the interplay between a coalition government and the
electorate, a similar setup can be found in the seminal contribution by Gilli-
gan and Krehbiel (1989). They analyzed policy outcomes when legislatures
delegate certain tasks to a better informed and heterogenous committee com-
paring open, modified and closed procedural rules with respect to the policy
outcomes.
While not focussing on the role of coalitions, signalling, as in our ap-
proach, is also central for policy reforms in the contribution by Cukierman
and Tommasi (1998). Here it is argued that an incumbent government which
makes a policy proposal contrary to its ideological stance has a strikingly
higher chance of getting it approved by the electorate than an incumbent
who would propose a policy close to its ideological position. From the incon-
gruence of the proposal with the political leaning of the proposer the voter
may derive valuable information on the true necessity of the reform. Accord-
ingly, Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) show how a leftist party may be more
1In addition to excellent surveys on the political economy of reform provided by Roland
(2002) or Drazen (2000), a collection of highly recommendable articles on the political
economy of reforms may be found in Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1998).
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able to signal the need for a rightist policy, while we show how a coalition
may make it easier for a leftist party to signal the need for a leftist policy.
Conveying information to voters via heterogenous preferences of policy-
makers also plays a central role in a range of models on electoral competition
(see, e.g., Roemer, 1994; Schultz, 1996; Martinelli, 2001). In all these exam-
ples, akin to our model, the actions of one player who has a different policy
stance than the voters or the other political actors convey information about
the true state of the world.
We proceed by describing our model (section 2). Then, the equilibrium
policy proposals for a single-party government and for a coalition government
are analyzed (sections 3 and 4). By comparison we show that a coalition
often facilitates implementation of a policy reform and improves the payoffs
of both parties and of the voters (section 5). In the concluding section 6 we
summarize the main findings.
2 The model
We study the outcome of a game between a government that proposes a
policy change and the voters (V ) who may approve or vote down the policy
proposal in a referendum. In the first case that we consider there are two
parties: a leftist (L) and a rightist (R) one. In the second case, there is also
a third, centrist (C) party.
For all players i = L,C,R, V their payoff ui decreases quadratically in
the distance between their bliss point, γ + ai, and the policy x ∈ R:
ui = − [x− (γ + ai)]2 . (1)
The actors’ bliss points depend on their individual policy preferences
ai ∈ R and a common, exogenous policy shock γ. While all actors observe
whether a shock has occurred, the political parties have private information
over its realization and, therefore, over the optimal policy response. For
example, while the voters observe the phenomenon of globalization, they
are unsure whether the optimal policy response is one of protectionism (a
“leftist” policy) or of liberalization (a “rightist” policy). Similarly, the voters
may observe an increased level of unemployment but be unsure whether the
best response is a tightening or a loosing of employment protection laws.
We capture this idea by assuming that γ is a random variable of which
only the prior distribution (which is common knowledge) is known by the
voters:
γ =
{
b with probability pi,
−b with probability (1− pi) . (2)
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By contrast, the political parties observe the true realization of γ for the
reasons spelled out earlier – they have large administrations gathering infor-
mation, costly external advice can be bought, and some documents typically
cannot be disseminated to the public for security reasons.
We now impose some restrictions on the policy preferences of the political
parties and of the voters. These are chosen with the aim of avoiding cum-
bersome case distinctions and to provide a simple example that leads to a
coalition government for the case of three parties with fixed policy positions.
Obviously, there are many other distributions than the one below that would
lead to the same result.
Assumptions:
1. aL < −2b and aR > −aL.
2. −2b < aC < b.
3. The voters’ individual policy preferences are distributed uniformly and
symmetrically around 0 with maximum support a ≥ aR.
Assumptions 1 and 3 assure that the leftist party holds a majority in the
two-party system. This is the first case that we consider. According to
assumption 2, the policy preferences of the centrist party lie in between
those of the other parties. Nevertheless, it does not hold a majority in a
three-party system, motivating the formation of a coalition government with
party L.2 This is the second case that we consider.
Figure 1 depicts the above assumptions as well as the payoff function of
the median voter, indexed m, for the cases γ = −b and γ = b. Note that
um(x0) denotes the median voter’s utility at the status quo policy, which we
normalize to x0 = 0.
We assume that the government proposes a policy xp ∈ R to the voters.
Subsequently, the voters decide in the referendum whether to accept or reject
the proposal. If it is rejected, then the status quo policy, x0 = 0, will be
implemented. Thus we model a situation where a government already exists
but a certain policy which might not have been central to the pre-election
phase needs approval by the voters.
Note that referenda are of increasing importance as a political decision
mechanism (see, e.g., Butler and Ranney, 1994). Recently, the ratification of
2Specifically, party C gets half of the voters with preferences in the interval [−aL, aC ]
and half of the voters with preferences in the interval [aC , aR]. Given our assumptions
a ≥ aR and aR > −aL, there will be some voters to the left of −aL so that party C gets
less than 50% of the votes.
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Figure 1: Preferences
international treaties in the European Union has been done through referenda
in a range of member countries. They also play an important role in Central
and Eastern European countries (Auer and Bu¨tzer, 2001). In a broader
interpretation, the referendum may be seen as a modeling device to capture
the idea that a government needs public support for its policies. If opposition
is too strong, the government may not be able to implement specific policies
even though it holds a majority in the legislature.
We are interested in whether a coalition government is better able than
a single-party government to implement reform policies by signalling private
information about a policy shock. For this purpose we first analyze the two-
party case where the leftist party L has a majority so that it can determine
the policy proposal which it puts on the agenda. Then, we go on by intro-
ducing a centrist party C and consider the three party case. Now, party L
does no longer obtain a majority on its own and forms a coalition with C.
We compare the policy outcomes for the two scenarios.
After the election of the government, the timing is as follows. In the
regime where party L governs alone:
1. Nature draws type γ ∈ {b,−b} according to the probability distribution
Pr[b] = pi and Pr[−b] = 1− pi.
2. The political parties (but not the voters) observe the realization of γ.
6
3. Party L decides on the policy xp that it presents to the voters in a
referendum.
4. The voters decide whether to accept or to reject the policy proposal
xp, and payoffs are realized.
In the coalition regime, at stage 3 the coalition partners have to agree on
the policy proposal. We will discuss this process further below. Otherwise,
the timing is the same. We assume that political parties and the voters
always accept a policy proposal if they are indifferent.
This is a dynamic game with incomplete information. In the next two
sections, we identify Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) for the two regimes,
thereby focusing on pure strategies.
3 Equilibrium with single-party government
A PBE is a set of strategies and beliefs such that, at any stage of the game,
strategies are optimal given the beliefs, and the beliefs are obtained from
equilibrium strategies and observed actions using Bayes’ rule (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1991). As the preferences of the individual voters are single
peaked (see eq. 1), the electorate can be represented by the median voter,
whose policy preferences are am = 0 (by assumption 3). Therefore, if party L
governs alone, there are only two players: party L who suggests a policy xp,
and the median voter who decides whether to accept or reject the proposal.
A PBE of this game consists of strategies for the party and the median voter
as well as the median voter’s beliefs over γ such that
(i) The median voter’s strategy is optimal given party L’s strategy and his
beliefs.
(ii) Party L’s strategy is optimal given the median voter’s strategy and be-
liefs.
(iii) Beliefs are derived from the party’s strategy using Bayes’ rule where
possible.
3.1 Analysis of separating equilibrium
We first consider a separating equilibrium and show, by contradiction, that
it does not exist. In a separating equilibrium, party L makes different policy
proposals depending on whether a leftist or a rightist shock has occurred,
which is denoted xl and xr respectively (i.e., xl ≡ xp(γ = −b) and xr ≡
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xp(γ = b)). Upon receiving the signal xl, the median voter then believes that
a leftist policy is required. Given this belief, he accepts a policy proposal iff
xl ∈ [−2b, 0] because this would (weakly) improve his payoff relative to the
status quo (see figure 1). Similarly, if he receives the signal xr, he believes
that a rightist policy is required and accepts a policy proposal iff xr ∈ [0, 2b].
Given the median voter’s strategy and beliefs, the best response of party
L is to propose xl = xr = −2b, i.e. to make the same proposal independent
of the direction of the shock. To see this we have to consider two cases.
If a leftist shock has occurred, party L prefers the policy x = −2b to any
policy x > −2b (by assumption 1). Hence the best proposal that would be
accepted by the median voter is xp = −2b. If a rightist shock has occurred,
party L prefers the policy x = −2b to any policy x > 0 (by assumption
1). Furthermore, any proposal xr ∈ (−2b, 0) would be rejected because this
signals a rightist shock to the median voter. Accordingly, the best response
of party L is to pretend that a leftist shock has occurred by sending the
signal xr = −2b, which the median voter would (erroneously) accept given
his beliefs. Hence there cannot exist a separating equilibrium.
Intuitively, by assumption 1 party L prefers a leftist policy even in the
case of a rightist shock. Therefore, it cannot credibly signal the type of the
shock to the median voter, and no separating equilibrium exists.
3.2 Analysis of pooling equilibrium
In a pooling equilibrium party L makes the same policy proposal xp indepen-
dent of the direction of the shock (i.e. xp(γ = −b) = xp(γ = b)). Therefore,
along the equilibrium path the median voter’s beliefs equal the priors, ac-
cording to which a rightist shock occurs with probability pi and a leftist
shock with probability 1 − pi. In a PBE of a signalling game there are no
restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. For parsimony, we assume that the
median voter believes that a rightist shock has occurred with probability pi
whatever signal he receives.
Turning to the median voter’s strategy, he will only accept a policy pro-
posal xp if it yields at least the same expected payoff as the status quo x0 = 0.
Given his beliefs, this is the case iff
−pi(xp − b)2 − (1− pi)(xp + b)2 ≥ −pib2 − (1− pi)b2 (3)
⇔ −2b (1− 2pi)
xp
≥ 1. (4)
The range of policy proposals for which (4) is satisfied depends on whether
the probability of a rightist shock, pi, is larger than that of a leftist shock.
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Specifically,
• if pi ≥ 0.5, the median voter accepts policy proposals
xp ∈ [0,−2b (1− 2pi)] ≥ 0;
• if pi < 0.5, the median voter accepts policy proposals
xp ∈ [−2b (1− 2pi) , 0] ≤ 0.
Thus, if the probability of a rightist shock is larger than that of a leftist
shock, the median voter only accepts proposals to the right of the status quo
and vice versa.
Party L anticipates this behavior so that its strategy also depends on
whether pi is smaller or larger than 0.5. In the latter case, the median voter
would only accept a rightist policy so that party L prefers the status quo.
Hence it will propose either to maintain the status quo or a policy that the
median voter then rejects, i.e. xp /∈ (0,−2b (1− 2pi)] independent of the
direction of the shock. Turning to the case pi < 0.5, the most leftist proposal
that will be accepted by the median voter is xp = −2b(1 − 2pi). Given this
constraint, it is also the best policy that party L can implement in a pooling
equilibrium.3
Intuitively, the bliss point of party L lies to the left of xp = −2b(1−2pi) in
the case of a leftist shock. By contrast, its bliss point with a rightist shock,
b + aL, may lie to the right of −2b(1 − 2pi) if aL is sufficiently close to −2b
and if pi is small (see Figure 1). However, in its decision party L puts more
weight on choosing its optimal implementable policy for the case of a leftist
shock, because this is the more likely scenario with pi < 0.5.
The findings of sections 3.1 and 3.2 are summarized in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 1 If party L governs alone, the following results obtain:
a) There exists no separating equilibrium.
b) If pi ≥ 0.5, then there exist an infinite number of pooling equilibria. In all
of them the status quo persists.
c) If pi < 0.5, then there exists a pooling equilibrium in which party L proposes
xp = −2b(1−2pi), which the median voter accepts. There exists no other
pooling equilibrium that party L prefers.
3See the appendix for a proof.
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Accordingly, reforms depend on the ex-ante probabilities of a rightist or
leftist shock, but not on the actual direction of the shock. Problems occur if
these two are in conflict with each other. Specifically, from the perspective of
the median voter reforms will often have the wrong direction, i.e. there is a
leftist reform despite a rightist shock. This happens if a rightist shock occurs
but its ex-ante probability is below 50%. Furthermore, a reform may not be
implemented although it would improve the payoff of the median voter and
of party L. This happens if a leftist shock occurs but its ex-ante probability
is below 50%. We now analyze whether a coalition government may be more
effective in signalling the occurrence of a shock, thereby improving the policy
outcome.
4 Equilibrium with coalition government
In order to analyze coalitions we now turn to the case in which there is a
third, centrist party, whose preferences lie in between those of the leftist and
the rightist party. Given assumptions 1 to 3 on the actors’ preferences, no
single party will obtain a majority in the national general elections. Instead,
the leftist and the centrist party will form a coalition government. In such a
coalition, the credibility towards the voters when suggesting a leftist policy is
increased because it has been approved by party C, whose policy preferences
lie further to the right of the political spectrum.
We do not model the bargaining process within the coalition. This would
be rather complex because one would have to account for the interaction of
the parties’ bargaining strategies with the beliefs and the behavior of the
voters. Instead, we focus on the two extreme situations where either of the
parties is the dominating coalition partner that can present policy proposals
as a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other coalition partner. In the following
we show that in both cases a separating equilibrium now exists.
4.1 Party L holds bargaining power
We first consider the case where party L holds all the bargaining power and
claim that the following profile of strategies and beliefs then constitutes a
PBE.4
(i) Strategy of party L: xl = max {−2b, 2aC − 2b} ; xr = 0.
4As above, party L’s policy proposals in the case of a leftist and a rightist shock are
denoted by xl and xr, respectively.
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(ii) Strategy of party C: Accept proposals xl ∈ [2aC − 2b, 0] and xr ∈
[2aC + 2b, 0]. Reject all other proposals.
(iii) Beliefs of the median voter: If confronted with a policy proposal xp <
min {2aC + 2b, 0}, the median voter believes that a leftist shock has
occurred with probability 1. If confronted with a policy proposal xp ≥
min {2aC + 2b, 0}, the median voter believes that a rightist shock has
occurred with probability 1.
(iv) Strategy of median voter: Accept proposals xp ∈ [−2b,min {2aC + 2b, 0})
and xp ∈ [0, 2b]. Reject all other proposals.
According to (iii) the median voter aligns his belief with the anticipated
behavior of party C. Specifically, a proposal xp < min {2aC + 2b, 0} would
never be accepted by party C in the case of a rightist shock; hence, the
median voter believes that a leftist shock has occurred with probability 1. By
contrast, if xp ≥ min {2aC + 2b, 0} the median voter believes that a rightist
shock has occurred with probability 1. Observe that these beliefs of the
median voter are consistent with the parties’ strategies on the equilibrium
path.
Turning to the median voter’s strategy, he will accept a leftist policy if
he believes that a leftist shock has occurred and if the suggested policy is
sufficiently moderate, i.e. not smaller than −2b. By contrast, he will accept a
rightist policy if he believes that a rightist shock has occurred, again provided
that the policy is not further away from his bliss point than the status quo
policy x0 = 0.
Party C’s strategy is a best response by construction. It knows the direc-
tion of the shock and, therefore, accepts policies that are closer to it’s bliss
point, aC + γ, than the status quo policy.
Turning to Party L, it would always prefer a more leftist policy than
xl = max {−2b, 2aC − 2b}. However, proposals smaller than −2b will always
be rejected by the median voter, and proposals smaller than 2aC − 2b will
always be rejected by party C; hence it cannot do better in case of a leftist
shock.
Furthermore, in case of a rightist shock, the most leftist proposal that
party C would accept is min {2aC + 2b, 0}. This implies that it would reject
a proposal xr = max {−2b, 2aC − 2b}. Hence, in contrast to the case of the
single-party government, L no longer has an incentive to lie and pretend
that a leftist shock has occurred if there was in fact a rightist shock. Put
differently, xl = max {−2b, 2aC − 2b} is a credible signal of a leftist shock
because the coalition partner would veto this signal in the case of a rightist
shock.
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Given that signals are informative, in the case of a rightist shock the
median voter would only accept proposals xr ∈ [0, 2b]. For party L all such
policies are worse than the status quo. Accordingly, a best response is to
propose precisely this status quo; or any policy that would be rejected so
that the status quo prevails.
4.2 Party C holds bargaining power
Next, consider the case where party C has all the bargaining power. Follow-
ing the same arguments as above, it is straightforward to show that in a PBE
party C would successfully propose the policies xl = max {−2b, aC − b} ; xr =
0.
The intuition is as follows. In the case of a leftist shock aC − b is party
C’s bliss point. Given the median voter’s beliefs that a leftist shock has
occurred, he will accept such a proposal as long as it is larger or equal to
−2b. Similarly, party L will not veto this proposal because aC − b < 0 by
assumption 2, which it prefers to the status quo. In the case of a rightist
shock, party L would veto any rightist policy. Similarly, in a separating
equilibrium where signals are informative the median voter would veto any
leftist policy proposal. Finally, party C has no incentive to lie and to pretend
that a leftist shock has occurred by proposing xl = max {−2b, aC − b}.5
Proposition 2 If party L is in a coalition with party C, then there exists a
separating equilibrium which involves the following policies:
a) If party L can present policies as a take-it-or-leave-it offer to party C
and a leftist shock has occurred, then the equilibrium policy is x =
max {−2b, 2aC − 2b}.
b) If party C can present policies as a take-it-or-leave-it offer to party L
and a leftist shock has occurred, then the equilibrium policy is x =
max {−2b, aC − b}.
a) If a rightist shock has occurred, the status quo prevails.
As in the case where proposals of party L do not have to be approved by
party C, there are only leftist reforms. This reflects the bias in the preferences
of the governing parties. However, in the coalition case leftist reforms are
only implemented if there has actually been a leftist shock because this can
5Party C’s utility from truly signaling a rightist shock is − [0− (b+ aC)]2. Us-
ing assumption 2, this is always larger than its utility from lying, which is
− [max {−2b, aC − b} − (b+ aC)]2.
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now be credibly signalled to the voters. Right shocks never spark a policy
change. Furthermore, due to signalling the extent of the leftist reform does
not depend on the ex-ante probability of a leftist shock, but on the parties’
preferences and the allocation of bargaining power within the coalition. As
expected, reforms are more extreme if bargaining power rests with the leftist
party.
5 Comparing payoffs
5.1 Party L
For the above PBE we now compare the players’ payoffs from an ex-ante
perspective, i.e. before the realization of the shock. We start with party
L. Denote the policies that obtain with a coalition government and a leftist
shock by
y ≡ max{−2b, (1 + µ)(aC − b)}, µ ∈ {0, 1}. (5)
Accordingly, µ = 1 and µ = 0 represent the cases where party L or
alternatively party C is the dominating coalition party which can make a
take-it-or-leave-it offer. Using Proposition 2, party L’s expected payoff in a
coalition government, indicated by superscript c, is
E[ucL] = −pi (−b− aL)2 − (1− pi) (y + b− aL)2 . (6)
Turning to the case where party L governs alone, indicated by superscript
s, one has to distinguish whether pi ≥ 0.5 or not (see Proposition 1). This
yields
E[usL|pi ≥ 0.5] = −pi (−b− aL)2 − (1− pi) (b− aL)2 , and (7)
E[usL|pi < 0.5] = −pi [−2b (1− 2pi)− b− aL]2
− (1− pi) [−2b (1− 2pi) + b− aL]2 .
(8)
Comparing (6) and (7), party L (weakly) prefers the coalition government
with C for pi ≥ 0.5 iff
(y + b− aL)2 ≤ (b− aL)2 . (9)
For µ = 1 we get y = −2b + max {2aC , 0}. Upon substitution, thereby
noting that both terms in brackets are positive, (9) can be stated equivalently
as
−b+ max{2aC , 0} − aL ≤ b− aL. (10)
13
Similarly, for µ = 0 we get y = −2b+ max {aC + b, 0} and (9) becomes
−b+ max{aC + b, 0} − aL ≤ b− aL. (11)
Both expressions are always satisfied by assumption 1. Turning to the
case pi < 0.5, we have to compare (6) and (8). For µ = 1, after rearranging
terms we obtain that party L (weakly) prefers the coalition government with
C for pi < 0.5 iff
(1− pi) y (max {aC , 0}) ≤ 2aL [(1− pi) (max {aC , 0})− pib] . (12)
For max {aC , 0} = 0, i.e. if aC ≤ 0, this is always satisfied because the l.h.s.
is then equal to 0 and the r.h.s. is positive. For max {aC , 0} = aC > 0 we
obtain
(1− pi) (aC − b) aC ≤ aL [(1− pi) aC − pib] . (13)
The l.h.s. is clearly negative. Therefore, a sufficient condition so that party
L prefers the coalition is (1− pi) aC < pib, where aC < b by assumption 1.
Accordingly, party L is more likely to prefer the coalition with C if the pref-
erences of the centrist party are not too far to the right and if the probability
of a rightist shock is not too low.
Intuitively, as aC increases the most leftist policy that party C accepts
in the case of a leftist shock moves to the right. This makes the coalition
less attractive for party L. Similarly, as the probability of a rightist shock
increases, the solution in a pooling equilibrium approaches the status quo
so that party L prefers the coalition government, where it can implement a
leftist policy at least if a leftist shock had occurred.
Turning again to the other case µ = 0, party L (weakly) prefers the
coalition government for pi < 0.5 iff
(1− pi) y (max {aC + b, 0}) ≤ 2aL [(1− pi) (max {aC + b, 0})− 2pib] . (14)
For max {aC + b, 0} = 0, i.e. if aC ≤ −b, this is always satisfied because
then the l.h.s. is equal to 0 and the r.h.s. is positive. For max {aC + b, 0} =
aC + b > 0 we obtain
(1− pi) (aC − b) (aC + b) ≤ 2aL [(1− pi) (aC + b)− 2pib] , (15)
for which the l.h.s. is again clearly negative. A sufficient condition so that
party L prefers the coalition is now (1− pi) (aC + b) < 2pib. Comparing
the conditions such that party L prefers the coalition to the single-party
government for µ = 1 and µ = 0, we find that this is less often the case if
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C is the dominating coalition partner.6 Intuitively, in this case the policy
outcome is less biased towards the preferences of party L.
5.2 Party C
We now turn to the effects of the coalition government on party C. First,
consider again the case µ = 1 where party L can make a take-it-or-leave-it
offer. Intuitively, because party C has a veto right in the coalition it could
always enforce the status quo. Therefore, if pi ≥ 0.5 party C must be at least
as well off in a coalition than if party L governs alone since the latter case
would lead to the status quo (see proposition 1). It remains to analyze the
case pi < 0.5. Given the symmetry of payoffs as defined in (1) and focusing
first on µ = 1, we only have to replace aL by aC in (12). There are again two
cases. For aC ≤ 0, party C always prefers the coalition because condition (12)
is clearly satisfied. For aC > 0, replacing aL by aC in (13) and rearranging
yields that party C prefers the coalition iff
(1− pi) b ≥ pib, (16)
which is always the case for pi < 0.5. The interpretation of this result is
straightforward. By joining the coalition party C benefits from gaining the
right to veto any policy proposal of party L.
Turning to the second case where C can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, it
could propose the same policy that L had chosen in the above case. Accord-
ingly, now that C is the dominating coalition partner its utility will be at
least as large as in the previous case and, therefore, higher than if L governs
alone. We can now state our main result which shows that parties are often
better off in a coalition than if one of them governs alone.
Proposition 3 Comparison of coalition government with the single-party
government of L:
a) Party C is always better off in the coalition government.
b) Party L is always better off in the coalition government if the rightist
shock is ex-ante more likely, i.e. pi ≥ 0.5.
c) If the leftist shock is ex-ante more likely, party L is better off in the coali-
tion if the policy preferences of C are sufficiently leftist and if the ex-
ante probability of a rightist shock is not too small. Specifically, a suf-
ficient condition for this is (1− pi) aC < pib if L holds all bargaining
6In order to see this, rewrite the above condition as (1− pi) aC < pib + b (2pi − 1) and
note that 2pi − 1 < 0 for pi < 0.5.
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power in the coalition, and (1− pi) (aC + b) < 2pib if party C holds all
bargaining power.
5.3 Voters
Now we examine whether the voters also benefit from the coalition govern-
ment. There is some prospect for this because party L is joined by a party
whose preferences are closer to those of the median voter. Furthermore, in
the coalition a leftist reform takes place only if there is indeed a leftist shock.
By contrast, if party L governs alone there may be no reform despite a policy
shock (pi ≥ 0.5), or a leftist reform is implemented although there is a rightist
shock (pi < 0.5). However, in the case of a leftist shock the coalition govern-
ment often undertakes a more leftist reform than party L could implement
if it governed alone which reduces its attractiveness for the voter.
Applying a utilitarian welfare function and given assumption 3 that vot-
ers’ policy preferences are equally distributed on the interval [a, a] with
a+ a = 0, welfare of the voters is given as
W =
1
a− a
∫ a
a
−(xp − (γ + a˜i))2da˜i, (17)
where (γ + a˜i) is the bliss point of a voter i. Integrating out yields
W = −(xp − γ)2 − 1
3
a2. (18)
Accordingly, the welfare function is a monotonic transformation of the
median voter’s utility function, where the former is simply reduced by 1/3a2.7
Therefore, welfare maximization is equivalent to maximizing the median
voter’s utility.
Given the symmetry of payoff functions, the median voter’s incentives
can be analyzed by replacing aL with am = 0 in section 5.1. For pi ≥ 0.5 we
then obtain from (10) and (11) that the voter always prefers the coalition.
Similarly, from (12) and (14) it follows that for pi < 0.5 the voter prefers the
coalition government iff
y (max {2aC , 0}) ≤ 0 for µ = 1, (19)
y (max {aC + b, 0}) ≤ 0 for µ = 0. (20)
Noting that y = max {−2b, (1 + µ)(aC − b)} < 0 this is always satisfied and
7Welfare declines the larger the support because the distance between the implemented
policy and the individual voters’ bliss points then increases.
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we obtain our last result.
Proposition 4 Welfare of the voters is always higher if party L does not
govern alone but in a coalition government with party C.
6 Conclusions
We developed an argument stressing asymmetric information between poli-
cymakers and voters in order to explain the impact of coalitions on policy
reforms. Our focus was on the example of a coalition between a leftist and a
centrist party. We showed that the parties’ heterogenous preferences enable
the coalition to overcome the government’s credibility problem. The reason
is that the centrist party controls the leftist party’s desire to implement a
leftist policy unless it is actually supported by a policy shock in this direc-
tion. Accordingly, by approving a policy the coalition partner signals the
necessity of a policy reform to the voter.
The policies as a response to exogenous shocks are strikingly different in
a coalition government as opposed to the case where the leftist party governs
alone. If there is no coalition parter that approves a policy proposal by the
more leftist party, only pooling equilibria exist. In this case reforms depend
on the ex-ante probability of a shock but not on its actual realization. As
a result, we may have a leftist reform despite a rightist shock. Similarly, a
leftist reform may fail although it would have been approved by the voters if
the party had been able to credibly signal the occurrence of a leftist shock.
These problems do not arise in a coalition government because the parties
can credibly signal their private information about policy shocks. As a con-
sequence, reforms only occur if they are supported by a policy shock that
points in the same direction as the reform.
Although the leftist party has less decision power in a coalition govern-
ment, it is often better off due to the gained ability to credibly signal a leftist
shock to the voter. The centrist party and the voter are always better off
with a coalition government. In conclusion, coalition governments are often
criticized because the decision process is hampered by the need to find a com-
promise satisfying the heterogenous preferences of the coalition partners. We
show that this reliance on a compromise can actually be beneficial because
it makes the resulting policy proposals more credible to the voters.
Appendix
Proof of statement (c) in Proposition 1 (mentioned in footnote 3)
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Maximizing the expected payoff of party L subject to xp ≥ −2b(1−2pi) yields
max
xp
− pi (xp − b− aL)2 − (1− pi) (xp + b− aL)2 s.t. xp ≥ −2b(1− 2pi).
(21)
The corresponding Lagrangian is
L = −pi (xp − b− aL)2 − (1− pi) (xp + b− aL)2 + λ [xp + 2b(1− 2pi)] , (22)
with first-order condition
−2pi (xp − b− aL)− (2− 2pi) (xp + b− aL) + λ = 0. (23)
Rearranging yields
xp = 2pib− b+ aL + 0.5λ. (24)
Suppose λ = 0. Then
xp = −b (1− 2pi) + aL < −2b(1− 2pi) (25)
for all values pi < 0.5 since aL < −2b by assumption 1. Accordingly, the
constraint binds by complementary slackness.
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